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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT 
MARKETS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MACRO-ECONOMICS 
By J. E. STIGLITZ* and A. WEISS** 
1. Introduction 
MORE than 200 years ago, Adam Smith wrote that if the interest rate was fixed 
too high 
... the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals 
and profectors ... Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a 
part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the 
competition.' 
In Stiglitz-Weiss (1981, 1983), we developed a theory of credit rationing. We 
argued that banks might not increase the interest rate they charged even in the 
face of an excess demand for funds, for to do so might reduce their expected 
rate of return because the probability of default would increase. Two reasons 
were presented for the possible inverse relationship between the rate of interest 
charged and the expected return to the bank: higher interest rates reduce the 
proportion of low risk borrowers (the sorting effect to which Smith had called 
attention) and higher interest rates induce borrowers to use riskier techniques 
(the incentive effect).2 
We argued that collateral and other non-price rationing devices would not 
eliminate the possibility of credit rationing. Increasing collateral requirements 
makes borrowers less willing to take risks, which increases the return to the 
bank. On the other hand, increasing collateral requirements may adversely 
affect the mix of applicants.3 Even if all individuals had the same utility functions 
and faced the same investment opportunities, wealthier individuals would both 
be willing to put up more collateral and would undertake riskier projects than 
would less wealthy individuals if there was decreasing absolute risk aversion.4 
Moreover, if large wealth accumulations are the result of risk-taking plus luck, 
a disproportionately large fraction of the very wealthy those who would put 
1 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776. 
2 More generally, the higher the interest rate charged, the higher the probability that any particular 
borrower will not repay, either because he has undertaken riskier actions which (with a higher 
failure rate) leave him unable to pay back the loan, or because he is willing to bear the costs 
associated with default (bankruptcy). The latter effect has been investigated in greater detail in the 
case of sovereign debt. See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986). 
3 In most other models in this literature, increasing collateral requirements is only helpful (see, 
for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1988, 1989) and Bester (1985)). The discussion below should 
make clear why these models are special. 
4 Subsequently, Wette (1983) showed that if opportunity sets differ across borrowers, not even 
the assumption of risk aversion is required. 
(D Oxford University Press 
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up a large amount of collateral would be those who were risk-loving (or at 
least not very risk averse): those who had gambled and won. These negative 
adverse selection (sorting) effects may dominate the positive incentive effects 
and the possible positive sorting effects associated with past successes. Lenders 
would then find that by increasing their collateral requirements beyond some 
point returns decrease. 
We developed our theory as a market explanation of the widely observed 
phenomena of red-lining and credit rationing. By red-lining we mean excluding 
certain observationally distinct groups from credit markets, rather than offering 
members of those groups a contract that demands higher interest payments 
and collateral requirements. By credit rationing we mean that among 
observationally identical borrowers some get loans while others are denied 
credit. Moreover, the excluded loan applicants are strictly worse off than the 
borrowers who get loans. (As in so many areas in economics, there is not 
universal agreement about the extent or importance of the phenomenon.)5 Our 
theory did not require recourse to explanations based on institutional 
considerations or government regulations.6 
In writing our papers, we attempted to present the simplest models that we 
thought provided the basic insights into the role of informational asymmetries 
in credit markets. We analyzed the sorting and incentive effects of loan contracts 
in isolation. We allowed lenders to vary either the interest rate charged borrowers 
or the collateral required for loans but not both.7 
In this paper we analyze a more realistic model of the credit market in which 
adverse selection and incentive problems are both present, and in which lenders 
can simultaneously vary collateral requirements and interest rates to affect both 
the mix of applicants and the incentives of successful loan applicants. We show 
that despite the richer strategy space available to lenders, the market equilibrium 
may be characterized by credit rationing in the sense defined earlier. Indeed, 
every risk class of borrowers may be rationed, and rationing may occur at every 
contract. The model we construct has several other interesting features: there 
may exist, for instance, pooling equilibria, ie, equilibria in which high risk and 
'The recent empirical work on this issue does suggest that credit market imperfections are 
important enough that they can be observed in a wide variety of data sets from different countries 
and industries. For instance, Devereux and Schianterelli (1989), Fazzari et al. (1988), Galeotti 
et al. (1990), Hoshi et al. (1988), and Hubbard and Kashyap (1989) report evidence of credit rationing 
in the UK, US, Italy, Japan, and US agriculture respectively. Gilchrist (1989) takes a different 
approach. He finds that an Euler investment equation is misspecified only for firms that pay low 
or no dividends. This is further supporting evidence of the significance of credit restrictions. 
6 The type of credit rationing with which we have been concerned should also be distinguished 
from the phenomenon that for any borrower the interest rate charged is an increasing function of 
the amount borrowed. This would be true with full information, provided that as the individual 
borrows more the likelihood of default increases. It is also true if the { interest rate, loan size} 
schedule serves as a self-selection device. Our theory attempted to explain why some individuals 
could not borrow funds at any interest rate, though similar individuals had access to funds. 
7 Bester ( 1985, p. 850) asserts that 'no credit rationing will occur in equilibrium if banks compete 
by choosing collateral requirements and the rate of interest to screen borrowers'. As we show below 
this assertion is false. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Mon, 22 Apr 2013 14:44:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
164 
OEP/696 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS 
low risk individuals borrow at the same terms. (In standard adverse selection 
models, such as Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976), pooling equilibria cannot exist.) 
Though we couch our analysis in terms of the credit market, it should be clear 
that our analysis, showing the importance of the interaction between sorting 
and incentive effects, has implications for the analysis of other markets as well. 
In particular, previous analyses (including our own) that have treated only the 
sorting effects or only the incentive effects of contracts in labor and insurance 
markets may have generated misleading results.8 
Perhaps the most important features of our model are its macro-economic 
implications, both their consistency with observed cyclical variations in real 
interest rates and their consequences for macroeconomic policy. Our analysis 
of Section 2 provides, for instance, a way to reconcile the frequent divergence 
between observed movements in real interest rates and inferred movements in 
the marginal productivity of capital over the business cycle. Conventional 
competitive theory suggests that the real (short term) interest rate equals the 
value of the marginal productivity of capital. With a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, shocks to the economy which increase (total factor or labor) 
productivity should, at fixed labor inputs, increase the marginal return on capital 
(and thus presumably the rate of interest) equi-proportionately; and since in 
booms, not only does labor productivity increase but labor input also increases, 
the increase in the real interest rate should be all the greater.9 Further, if the 
production function exhibits less than unitary elasticity between capital and 
labor, as suggested by most econometric evidence, the increase in the real interest 
should be still larger. Yet, real short term interest rates charged borrowers, or 
paid depositors, exhibit neither the qualitative nor quantitative variations which 
such a theory would suggest; in some recessions they even increase.'0 We discuss 
these and other macroeconomic implications of our model in Section 2.11 
8 For example, in a recent paper, DeMeza and Webb (1987) only consider the sorting effects of 
credit contracts. They find that informational asymmetries lead to overinvestment in a model in 
which the return on safe projects (whether successful or unsuccessful) are the same as those of 
risky projects. Thus they assume that among observationally identical projects, some stochastically 
dominate others. Their results also depend on this assumption. 
9 Jon Fay and James Medoff (1985) cite the 'substantial literature' on the positive correlation 
between employment and labor productivity over the business cycle. They present firm level data 
that suggests that this correlation is due to labor hoarding in slumps. We are not concerned with 
explaining the pro-cyclical pattern of labor productivity; we are rather concerned with why, given 
the procyclical movement of average, and presumably marginal productivity, real interest rates 
are not clearly pro-cyclical. The presence of labor hoarding simply implies that the 'true' increase 
in the labor-capital ratio in booms is greater than the 'observed' increase. 
10 Moreover, the kinds of explanations for deviations from observed average market prices and 
marginal productivities which are sometimes adduced in other markets-such as the presence of 
long term contracts-seem unpersuasive in this context. Movements of real interest rates in auction 
markets, such as the market for government bills, show similar patterns; and to the extent that 
there are differences, such as loan rates failing to fall as much as T bill rates in the Great Depression, 
the differences are just the opposite from what one would expect from a long term relationship, 
for they entail a substantial increase in real interest rates charged during slumps. 
" One cautionary note is perhaps in order at this point. The equilibria discussed in Section I 
are not, in general, unique. It is a commonplace observation that in models with multiple equilibria, 
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Thus, the current paper extends our earlier work in three essential ways: it 
incorporates simultaneously both selection and incentive effects; it considers 
simultaneously both price (interest rate) and non-price (collateral) terms of the 
loan contract; and it goes beyond the microeconomic implications of our theory 
of credit for credit rationing and red-lining to analyze the macroeconomic 
implications, both with respect to cyclical movements of variables, such as the 
real interest rate, as well as the effectiveness of monetary policy.12 
1. Microeconomic equilibrium 
This section is divided into four parts. The first describes the basic model, 
the second provides some preliminary analytics, the third describes the market 
equilibrium and the fourth discusses several extensions of the analysis. 
1.1. The basic model 
The model consists of a description of borrowers and banks and an analysis 
of their interactions. 
(a) Borrowers. We assume that the representative borrower has two possible 
techniques into which he can invest the funds lent by the bank. A project either 
is successful, yielding a return of RS or Rr depending on the technique used, 
with RS < Rr; or is unsuccessful, in which case it has a return of zero. The 
probability of success of the 'safe' technique is pS, for the risky, pr, with pS > pr. 
Lenders cannot observe directly which technique a borrower is using. A project 
there are problems with comparative statics because the policy change might induce a 'switch' to 
another equilibrium. 
However, if one took this observation to mean that one should never calculate comparative 
statics for models with multiple equilibria, this would almost always prevent economic models from 
being used to guide policy. It is unlikely that a reasonable model of the economy can be constructed 
that does not have multiple equilibria. For example, the economy that we are acquainted with has 
weekends on Saturday and Sunday. There is undoubtedly another (more or less efficient equilibrium) 
with weekends on Sunday and Monday. We do not believe that the existence of this other equilibrium 
precludes economic analysis of the effects of the 1986 tax reforms, or predictions of the effects of 
a drought on GNP. Nor should the existence of multiple equilibria in our model preclude analyses 
of past changes in interest rates: the detailed investigation of credit markets that is needed to give 
our model empirical content would also reveal which equilibria the economy was in. 
On the other hand, if it is not implausible that the contemplated policies would change the 
strategies of banks, moving the economy from one equilibria (such as each bank offering only one 
credit contract) to a different one (such as one where every bank offers several credit contracts), 
then that possibility should be acknowledged. While in those circumstances the existence of multiple 
equilibria still does not foreclose economic analysis, it does introduce an additional form of 
uncertainty into the analysis-strategic uncertainty in which the market participants are uncertain 
of what strategies the other participants will be playing. 
12 As in our earlier work, we focus on loan contracts as the source of finance. The evidence of, 
reasons for, and consequences of limitation on equity markets have been detailed elsewhere; see, 
e.g. Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss [1984], Myers and Majluf [1984], Greenwald and Stiglitz 
[1988a,b, 1992], and Stiglitz [1992]. 
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costs a fixed amount, greater than the wealth of any borrower; we normalize 
this cost at unity. Each borrower can undertake at most one project. (Our 
results only require that there be a region of increasing returns to scale.13 The 
stronger assumption of fixed project size is made for expositional ease.) 
Banks make loan offers characterized by an interest rate r and a collateral 
requirement C. The borrower has an initial wealth of WO; this is of two forms: 
collateralizable wealth, C0, and non-collateralizable wealth, Ho. The latter 
includes pensions, potential inheritances, and human capital. For simplicity, we 
assume all borrowers have the same utility function. Differences in wealth then 
induce differences in the indifference curves between the required interest 
payments on a loan and the required collateral.'4 
Similar considerations are germane to an analysis of corporate borrowing. 
Although corporations do not have non-collateralizable wealth of the form we 
have discussed, the relevant decision makers in different corporations are affected 
differently when a corporation goes bankrupt. In the case of large publicly 
traded corporations the relevant decision maker may have substantial wealth 
that is not tied to the solvency of the corporation, while the owner-operator of 
small privately owned corporations may lose a large proportion of his assets 
in the case of corporate bankruptcy. The proportion of a decision maker's 
wealth that is linked to the solvency of the corporation, and the opportunities 
to remove that wealth prior to bankruptcy, are typically not fully known by 
lenders. 
Wealth not invested in the project yields a safe return of i*. The bank requires 
the borrower to put up collateral C, and to pay interest on its loan of r.'5 
(Alternatively, the bank could require the borrower to invest in the project. 
None of our results would change if the bank required the borrower to put up 
some of his liquid assets as equity.) Thus, if the project is successful, the 
end-of-period wealth of the borrower is16 
Y, = W + R-(1 + r) (la) 
13 Not even that assumption is required for the analysis. What is required is that there be an 
initial non-convexity in the function relating expected loan returns to loan size. The incentive 
compatibility constraints may induce such a non-convexity, even when the underlying production 
technology is convex. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Hellwig (1977). 
14 It should be clear that all that is required for the subsequent analysis is that the slopes of 
these indifference curves differ systematically with wealth. It does not matter whether those differences 
arise solely from differences in wealth, or from differences in the underlying preferences. 
15 We assume that the loan can only be partially collaterized, i.e. C < 1, implying that the bank 
must charge an interest rate r > i*. With full collateral, loans would not be risky, and would 
accordingly bear the same interest rate as government securities, providing strong evidence that 
even in the most highly collaterized loans, collateral is limited. What is relevant, from the perspective 
of the lender, is the value of the collateral in those events when the borrower defaults. These 
circumstances (as the S &L's in the United States have discovered with a vengeance) are precisely 
the circumstances when collateral is likely to have a low value, and thus not fully compensate the 
lender for what is due to him. 
16 More generally, we can write income as a function of R as: Y = max{ W + R - (1 + r), 
W - C}. 
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while, if it is unsuccessful, the end-of-period wealth is17 
Yo= W-C (lb) 
where 
W = WO(1 + i*), C = C(1 + i*). 
The expected utility of a borrower is 
E{ U} = U(Y1)p + U(Yo)(1 -p). 
We assume the borrower is risk averse and that there is decreasing absolute 
risk aversion. 18 The assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion is important 
for our analysis since it implies that holding interest rates and collateral fixed, 
wealthier borrowers choose riskier techniques. 
It is clear that, if the borrower has no choice of technique then his indifference 
curve between collateral and interest is concave, as depicted in Figure 1. If the 
borrower can only use the safe technique, his indifference curve through any 
point would be flatter than if he could only use the risky technique. The reduction 
in interest rate required to compensate the individual for an increase in collateral 
is smaller, since the probability of losing the collateral (the probability of a 
default) is smaller. The slope of the indifference curve is 
dr _ U'0(1-p) (2) 
dCu U'1p 
where 
dU(Y1) U =_ UI(Yi) d(K), i=O, 1. 
The borrower chooses the technique that gives him the higher expected utility. 
The borrower is indifferent between the two techniques along the locus defined by 
EUr_ U(yr)pr + U(Y0)(1 - pr) = U(YI)ps + U(Yo)(1 - pS) = EUS (3) 
where Yr denotes the end-of-period wealth of a borrower who uses the risky 
technique and is successful; Y' is defined similarly. Note that YO (end-of-period 
wealth if the project is unsuccessful) does not depend on the technique used. 
17 We are implicitly assuming that in the case of default the bank can only attach the assets of 
the borrower that have been put up as collateral. We would argue that this is realistic both for 
the case of individuals and corporations. Typically even unsecured loans that are a small fraction 
of a borrower's wealth demand much higher interest rates than secured loans. This is because the 
post-default bargaining position of a bank is seriously affected by whether it has physical possession 
of sufficient collateral to cover the debt. If the bank needs to sue for wealth that has not been put 
up as collateral there are many opportunities for the borrower to avoid payment. In the case of 
corporations typically stockholders get some share of the assets in the case of bankruptcy even 
when unsecured debtors are getting less than the full value of their debt. The formulation in (1) 
implicity assumes that while the bank holds the collateral, it earns an interest rate of i, which is 
returned to the borrower if he repays the loan and is appropriated by the lender if he does not. 
18That is, we assume U' > 0, U" < 0, and dA/dY < 0, where A =-U"/U. 
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FIG. la. Indifference curves 
Of two individuals with the same wealth, the one with the riskier technique has a steeper indifference curve. 




FIG. lb. Indifference curves 
A rich individual has a flatter indifference curve than a poorer individual; he requires a smaller reduction in the 
interest rate to compensate him for an increase in collateral. 
The locus of { C, r} combinations satisfying (3) is called the switch line. The 
switch line is positively sloped: 
dr = U'(yo)(ps _ pr) >0. (4) 
dCEU EU U( Ys )ps _ U( y )pr 
Above the switch line the borrower uses the risky technique; below it, where 
interest rates are low and collateral requirements are high, the borrower uses 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Mon, 22 Apr 2013 14:44:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
169 
J. E. STIGLITZ AND A. WEISS OEP/701 
r 







The switch line gives those { interest rate, collateral }pairs at which the borrower is indifferent between undertaking 
the safe and risky projects. It is upward sloping. 
r l o 
Switch line of the Poor l 
| /~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ic line of the Rich 
C 
FIG. 2b. 
The switch line of the poor lies above that of the rich. 
the safe technique. Thus, by specifying C and r, the bank can indirectly control 
the technique used by the investor. 
Note that the indifference curves of the individual-taking into account the 
changes in technique choices which occur as C and r change-are not concave. 
They appear as in Figure 2, with the indifference curve above the switch line 
being discretely steeper than below it, reflecting the higher probability of failure. 
(Recall from (2) that the slope of the indifference curve depends on the ratio 
of the probability of failure to the probability of success and on the ratio of 
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slope=xp s+ (1 -x)pr 
S 
slope=p 
z y x 
r' r* rmax 
FIG. 3. 
Collateral fixed at CP 
At r', rich switch to risky project 
At r*, poor switch to risky project 
Above rma. no one borrows 
x = fraction of those borrowing at CP who are poor 
U0 to U',, both of which change discretely, and in the same direction, at the 
switch line.) 
In this paper, we assume there are two types of individuals who differ only 
in their wealth. Denoting the rich with subscript r, and the poor with a subscript p, 
W<W C <C p r' p r- 
Our assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the switch line 
for the rich lies everywhere below the switch line of the poor." Thus, in Figures 3-6, 
we identify three regions: for contracts in region X, both the rich and poor 
use the risky technique; in region Z both use the safe one; in region Y. the poor 
use the safe technique and the rich the risky technique. 
The indifference curve of the rich through any point in the region X or Z 
(where they both use the same technique) (Figure 6) is always flatter than that 
of the poor; they need less of a reduction in interest charges to compensate 
them for any increase in collateral, given that they use the same technique. But 
19 Consider a rich individual offered a contract along the switch line. A switch from the safe to 
the risky technique can be viewed as a mean utility preserving change, in the sense of Diamond 
and Stiglitz'(1977). Hence we know from Diamond and Stiglitz that a mean-utility preserving 
change for one individual induces a reduction in expected utility for a more risk averse individual 
(in the Arrow-Pratt sense of absolute risk aversion). 
Hence, along the poor individual's switch line 
EU(Y'j)pr + EU(Yo)(1 - pr) < EU(Y )p., + EU(Yo)(l - ps) 
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in region Y, where the rich use the riskier technique and the poor the safer one, 
the indifference curve of the rich may be steeper than that of the poor.20 
(b) Banks. Banks are risk neutral. If technique i is used, the expected return 
to the bank, v, is 
v =pi(1 + r) + (1- pi)C. (5) 
For a given project, the iso-return curve is a straight line. As can be seen in 
Figure 5, the iso-return line below the switch line intersects the switch line at 
a point southwest of where the iso-return line above the switch line intersects 
the switch line. This is because of the discrete change in the technique used.2' 
Regardless of whether the individual uses the safe or the risky technique the 
borrower's indifference curve is steeper than the bank's iso-return locus, because 
the borrower is risk averse.22 
(c) Equilibrium. Banks know that there are poor and rich borrowers, but 
cannot ascertain who is of which type. They know, however, that the choice of 
credit contracts-defined here by an interest rate and collateral requirement- 
may reveal information about who is of which type; the mix of applicants at 
one contract may differ from the mix at another (clearly any borrower applying 
for a contract with collateral requirements in excess of Cp must be rich). They 
also know that contracts have incentive effects, determining whether a rich or 
poor borrower undertakes the safe or risky project. 
In equilibrium, the set of loan contracts offered and loan commitments made 
by banks, must be such that no bank can increase its profits by offering a different 
20 Using (2) in regions X or Z, where the two individuals differ only in wealth, 
dIn U'0/U'1 U'6 U= 
dW U'0 1 
with decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
In Region Y, while for the rich, (1 - p)/p is higher, U'/ U'1 will be smaller. 
21 Formally at the switch line, the choice of technique is unrestricted by notions of dominance 
or any of the equilibrium refinements. (The individual is indifferent as to which technique he 
employs.) Accordingly, we can assume that on the switch line the borrower is undertaking the safe 
project with some probability. For each point on the switch line there is some probability of 
undertaking the safe project, such that the expected return to the bank is v. In this sense, then, the 
iso-return curve to the bank, though peculiarly shaped, is not necessarily discontinuous. It follows 
the switch line connecting the straight lines in Figure 3. However, as will be apparent below if a 
pooling or complete separating equilibrium exists it is characterized by all those borrowers who 
are indifferent between safe and risky projects choosing the safe projects. 
22 (dr -(1 - pi) 
idC es pi 
which is always less than the slope of the indifference curve given by (2) since Y1 > Y0 and U" < 0. 
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contract or a different mix of contracts, or changing the number of loan 
commitments it is making.23 
The interest rate paid depositors elicits a supply of lonable funds equal to 
the equilibrium quantity of loan acceptances.24 In this paper, we do not formally 
model the supply function of funds, simply hypothesizing that it is an increasing 
function of the interest rate paid depositors (i): L = L(i), L'(i) > 0. We assume 
banks are sufficiently small that no bank affects the interest rate paid 
depositors.25 We also assume that each bank is large enough that its probability 
of bankruptcy is negligible. (These two assumptions are consistent, provided 
the economy is large enough.) 
1.2. Some preliminaries 
Several properties of the equilibrium may easily be derived. First, in 
equilibrium, each bank earns zero profits. If a bank earned negative profits it 
would not make any loans. If any bank made positive profits some other bank 
would offer a slightly more attractive set of contracts, one that attracts all the 
borrowers that were previously getting loans and does not change the choices 
made by those borrowers.26 It follows that in equilibrium, the rate of interest 
paid depositors must be equal to the expected return on a loan contract. 
We denote by v, { K } the expected return to the bank from contract K when 
a fraction x of those taking it are poor; v1 is the expected return when only 
23 Formally, we can describe interactions of banks and borrowers in terms of a game. We use 
the Kreps-Wilson definition of a sequential equilibrium, and do not allow (weakly) dominated 
strategies to be played in equilibrium. 
The actions of borrowers and lenders follow a sequence of moves which can be broken down 
into five stages. In the first stage, banks choose contracts to offer. In the second stage, borrowers 
apply for loans. A borrower cannot apply for a loan contract that requires more collateral than 
the borrower has. In the third stage, banks make loan commitments-accept borrowers. In the 
fourth stage, borrowers accept from among the contracts that they were offered the one that gives 
them the highest expected utility. If borrowers are offered several loans that give them the same 
utility, they randomize their choices. 
In the final stage of the game, borrowers choose the investment project that maximizes their 
expected returns given their loan contracts. For simplicity, we assume banks do not observe the 
contracts offered by their rivals and hence their offers cannot be contingent on others' (unobservable) 
contracts. 
We could alternatively have assumed that banks can observe the contracts offered by other 
banks when determining the quantity of loans to make. Assuming that contracts are not observed 
allows us to use the Nash definition of equilibrium and still ignore out-of-equilibrium moves such 
as threats of the form 'if you offer an attractive loan contract I'll make so many loans that the 
interest rate paid depositors will be so high that we shall both lose money'. If contracts offered 
by other banks are observed then we would have to require that equilibria satisfy subgame perfection 
to eliminate these unreasonable threats. 
24 Alternatively, we could have included an auction for deposits as a formal part of the game. 
However, adding bids for deposits to the action space of lenders increases the complexity of the 
model without substantively changing the results. 
25 Alternatively, we could have assumed that the interest rate paid depositors is set before loan 
commitments have been made. 
26 This follows from the fact that reducing collateral requirements and interest rates in such a 
way as to leave incentives unchanged has positive selection effects. 
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FIG. 4. 
F is the optimal contract to the poor 
G is the optimal contract to the rich 
If there exists a pooling equilibrium, it must lie at F. 
the poor take it. In the obvious notation 
v1{K} = vp{K} and v0{K} vr{K}. 
We denote by contract { F } the contract with C = Cp and the highest interest 
rate consistent with the poor using the safe technique. Contract { G} is the 
contract with C = Cr and the highest interest rate consistent with the rich using 
the safe technique. (See Figures 4 and 6.) 
Let Nr and Np denote the number of rich and poor investors; N = Np + Nr' 
and z = Np/N. Then v,{ F} is the expected return to the bank on contract F 
when it is obtained by poor and rich borrowers in the proportion that they are 
in the population as a whole. 
We denote the maximized expected utility of type i with contract K as UI { K }. 
Since only rich borrowers can choose contract { G} we write vo { G} as v(G); 
vp{F} may be either greater or less than v(G). The collateral requirement is 
higher at G than at F and this increases the bank's expected return; but the 
interest rate may be lower (because the rich borrower's switch line lies below 
that of the poor).27 
27 Obviously, if the interest rate at G is greater than at F (or not much less), then bank profits 
at G exceed those at F. Increases in the collateralizable wealth of the rich have two effects: the 
switch line is shifted down, which decreases the bank's profits; while the direct effect of more 
collateral serves to increase the bank's profits. The net effect is ambiguous, and depends on the 
extent to which (absolute) risk aversion decreases with wealth and on the relative differences 
between the collateralizable and non-collateralizable wealth of the rich and poor. If there is 
constant absolute risk aversion, then the switch lines would coincide; by continuity, with slightly 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, the bank's return at G always exceeds that at F. The converse 
will be true if there is strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion, and the difference in 
non-collateralizable wealth between the rich and poor borrowers is large relative to the difference 
between their collateralizable wealth. 
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1.3. Equilibrium with incentive and sorting effects 
For simplicity of exposition, we focus in the text on the case where each bank 
can issue only one loan contract. In Appendix C, we consider the more general 
case. (The equilibria that we describe turn out also to be equilibria if each bank 
is allowed to issue more than one contract, but with this wider set of available 
strategies, there may be other equilibria as well.)28 
There may exist reasonable equilibria with and without rationing. Either may 
be characterized by complete pooling (all rich and poor borrowers receiving 
the same contract) or by partial separating (at least some of the rich borrowers 
receiving loans at different contract terms from those received by the poor 
borrowers). 
1.3.a. A pure pooling equilibrium with rationing 
We first show that if there is a pure pooling equilibrium with rationing, it 
must be at {F}, the contract requiring Cp of collateral, and offering the highest 
interest rate at which the poor borrowers invest in the safe project. We shall 
assume that profits (per dollar loaned) at F when the fraction of the poor equals 
or exceeds z are higher than at any contract where the borrowers use the risky 
technique.29 Hence, we can exclude every contract in region X of Figure 4 from 
being a pooling equilibrium with rationing. Since {F} generates higher profits 
than (other) contracts in region Y, those contracts also can be excluded as 
candidates for pooling equilibria with rationing. Finally, no contract in region 
Z can be a pooling equilibrium with rationing because contract { G} generates 
strictly greater profits than do those contracts. Thus, rationed borrowers would 
be offered contract { G} and the bank making that offer would make positive 
profits. 
There is a pooling rationing equilibrium at {F} if and only if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(a) v1(F) > v(G), profits at F (with pooling) are higher than at G 
(b) L(v,(F)) < N, the supply of funds at {F} is less than the demand. 
28 In the case where each bank can issue only one contract the five stage game described in the 
earlier footnote reduces to a single stage. This makes the analysis much simpler, and avoids the 
controversies associated with the use of alternative refinements in extensive form games. 
To see this, first note that even without this restriction, the five stage game can be reduced to a 
three stage game. This is because whatever beliefs borrowers have, their actions in the fourth and 
fifth periods are automatic. They choose the best contract offered to them, and given that contract, 
they choose the technique that maximizes their expected utility. 
When lenders offer only a single contract, once a contract is offered the reactions of borrowers 
are automatic (except when they are indifferent between two projects). The only undominated 
strategies are ones in which borrowers apply for every contract that makes them better off than 
not borrowing. Because loan applications to one bank are not observed by other banks, the loan 
a borrower received from any bank would not be changed by his applications to another bank. 
By the same token, given the actions of the other banks, each bank simply chooses the loan contract 
that maximizes its expected profits per dollar loaned. Thus, the entire five stage game is reduced 
to a single stage. 
29That is, pr(I + Rr) < v_{F}F 
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To see this, observe that if pooling at {F} is an equilibrium, i = v_(F), and the 
supply of funds is L(v_ { F }). Hence rationing at F will occur if and only if 
condition (b) is satisfied. 
To show that 'all banks offering F' is a rationing equilibrium, consider a 
deviation from { F } by some bank offering a single contract rather than { F }. 
If the bank offers a contract with C > Cp, clearly only the rich will undertake 
if. The contract that maximizes the return from the rich, assuming that they 
undertake the safe project, is {G}. By (a), and the assumption that banks 
compete for depositors, even if the rich were to accept contract { G}, the bank 
would lose money on those contracts. By assumption, the contract that 
maximizes the return to the risky project (zero collateral) yields a lower return 
than {F},30 and afortiori, the contract that maximizes the return to the risky 
project, subject to the constraint that it generates a level of expected utility 
greater than U'{F}, must yield a lower return than {F}. 
If v{G} > vz(F), then, because any lender that offered {G} would find that 
some individuals those who were not offered loans at {F}-would accept 
the contract, a pure pooling rationing equilibrium could not be sustained. 
1.3.b. Interior pooling equilibria without rationing 
If at contract { F }, the supply of funds exceeds the demand, ie, L(v, { F }) > N, 
lenders compete for borrowers; they reduce collateral requirements and interest 
rates charged in such a way as to ensure that poor borrowers continue to 
undertake the safe project, ie, they offer contracts southwest of F along the 
switch line of the poor. Let {H} denote the contract along the switch line at 
30 The fact that the zero collateral contract maximizes the expected return to a risky project 
follows from the risk aversion of borrowers; any contract with C > 0 could be replaced with a 
contract yielding a higher expected profit, a higher expected utility to the borrower and a smaller 
value of C. 
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which the demand for funds equals the supply. (See Figure 6.) If at {H} the 
return per dollar lent is higher than at the contract { G } and if below the switch 
line (in the region Y) the indifference curve of the poor through { H} is steeper 
than that of the rich, then 'all firms offering H' is a pooling equilibrium without 
rationing. 
The argument for why this is a pooling equilibrium is the same as earlier, 
except now we also need to ask, 'Can we find contracts in region Y (below the 
switch line) but with more collateral which attract only poor customers?' Under 
the stipulated conditions concerning the slopes of the indifference curves, 
whenever a contract in v is preferred to { H} by the poor (ie, lies below the 
poor's indifference curve through H) it is also preferred by the rich (ie, lies 
below their indifference curve through H). Because of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, the indifference curves of the rich may well be flatter than those of 
the poor in region Y, even though the rich are choosing the riskier technique. 
Hence, we have established the possibility of interior pooling equilibria, where 
borrowers do not put up all their collateralizable wealth as collateral: there 
exists an interior pooling equilibrium without rationing at H if and only if 
(a) L(vz { F }) > N (at F there is an excess supply of credit) and L(v,{H}) = N 
(b) For all {r, C} such that 
(i) UP{r, C} > UP{H}, 
This content downloaded from 128.59.160.233 on Mon, 22 Apr 2013 14:44:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
177 
J. E. STIGLITZ AND A. WEISS OEP/709 
(ii) C < Cp, then 
Ur{r, C} > Ur{H} 
(infeasibility of profitable separation) 
(c) v{H} > v{G} (H is more profitable than G). 
1.3.c. A partial pooling-partial separating equilibrium with rationing 
There are also rationing equilibria in which some of the rich and poor borrow 
at the same terms, while some rich borrowers accept contracts that are not 
chosen by any poor borrowers. 
Suppose: 
i) the rich borrowers prefer contract {G} to contract {F}, that is, 
EUr{G} > EUr{F} 
ii) vZ(F) < v(G) < v,(F) 
iii) L(v(G)) < N. 
There is a rationing equilibrium in which some banks offer contract { F } and 
others offer contract { G}. All the rich borrowers apply for loans at every bank 
offering either contract {G} or {F}. A rich borrower only accepts a contract 
{F} offer if he is not offered a {G} loan. In equilibrium, the number of rich 
borrowers getting G loans, NG, is such that the proportion of poor borrowers, 
x, among those accepting {F} loans satisfies 
v.(F)= v(G), 
so that both contracts offered are equally profitable. By continuity and (ii) 
there always exists a value of x satisfying this condition.3' The number of F 
loans made, NF, is such that 
L(v(G)) = NG + NF. 
If L(v(G)) > NG, NF > 0: both { G} and {F} are offered, and rationed; while 
if L(v(G)) < NG, only {G} is offered. 
While both rich and poor borrowers are rationed the rich borrowers are 
more likely to get loans than are the poor borrowers. 
Proof of equilibrium. To show that it is an equilibrium, all we need to establish 
is that it does not pay any bank to deviate. First, assume that some bank 
offering {G} should decide to offer {F}. The change increases the proportion 
of the rich accepting contract offers at {F}, and hence lowers the profitability 
of those loans. Hence, that bank (and all other banks offering {F}) would find 
its profits lowered: clearly, it would not pay any bank to do this. Conversely, 
if any bank offering {F} switched to {G}, the proportion of rich accepting 
contracts at { F } would be lower, and hence profits would be higher. This would 
thus induce a shift back. 
Nor does it pay any firm to offer any other contract. First, consider contracts 
31 Recall our assumption that banks cannot observe a borrower's application to another bank, 
or whether a borrower is rich or poor. 
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EUr (G) = EUr (F) 
(equal utility locus) 
W p .......................................... V I(F) v 0(G ) (equal return locus) 
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FIG. 7. 
Above the equal utility locus, the rich prefer G to F. Above the equal return locus, v1(F) > vo(G). Near {CP,,WP} 
the equal return locus lies below the equal utility locus. The shaded area gives, for fixed collateralizable and 
noncollateralizable wealth of the poor, the set of collateralizable wealth levels of the rich for which there exists 
a separating equilibrium. 
with C > CP. These will only be taken up by the rich, and the most profitable 
of such contracts is {G}. Next, consider contracts with C < CP. The most 
profitable of such contracts in region Y is clearly {F}. And in region X, both 
groups use the risky technique, and accordingly the returns to the bank are lower. 
Proof that partial pooling-partial separating equilibrium can arise. A natural 
question is whether the inequalities v1{F} > v{G} > v {F} and EUr{G} > 
EU'{F} are consistent with one another. With (sufficiently) decreasing absolute 
risk aversion and (sufficiently) large differences in non-collateralizable wealth, 
the switch line of the poor is moved up relative to the rich enough that both 
v1{F} > v{G} and EUr{G} > EUr{F}. In Figure 7 we depict, for fixed 
collateralizable and non-collateralizable wealth of the poor and given decreasing 
absolute risk aversion utility functions, the set of collateralizable and 
non-collateralizable wealth levels of the rich for which there may exist a partially 
separating equilibrium.32 
32The proof proceeds first by expressing the contract { G} as a function C, and W. Then 
v1 {F} = vo{G} and EUV{G} = EU?{F} can be viewed as defining implicit relations between W. 
and Cr. We evaluate the derivative dWr/dCr at {CP, Wp}, and show that the equal return locus 
lies below the equal utility locus, and both loci have positive, finite slopes. Since for a partial-pooling 
equilibrium, endowments must lie above the equal utility locus (so the rich prefer G to F) and 
above the equal return locus (so the return to loans to the poor only at F yield higher returns 
than to the rich at G), the relative slopes of the loci ensures that there exist endowments upporting 
partial-separating equilibria with rationing. For a proof, see J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, (1985). 
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1.3.d. Other equilibria 
The forms of equilibria on which we have focused are not the only possible 
ones. There is also, for instance, a (trivial) separating equilibrium with rationing 
in which only contract { G } is offered, and some, but not all, of the rich borrowers 
get loans at { G }. The poor borrowers would, of course, be unable to get loans. 
There may also exist equilibria with rationing at one contract, but not at 
another. Suppose there exists a contract H, lying along the rich individual's 
switch line, with Cr > C(H) > C,, such that 
v(H) = 
v,(F), Ur(F) 
> Ur(H), and Nr < L(vz(F)), 
then there exists an equilibrium in which all borrowers apply for loans at F 
and rejected rich borrowers borrow at H; there may be rationing at F but there 
will not be rationing at H. 
The reasoning is as follows: any rich borrower that gets a loan at F takes 
it. A lender offering a contract southwest of F or H would incur losses; a 
contract northeast of H would not attract any borrowers, a contract northeast 
of F would only attract rich borrowers and, hence, losses. 
There are also equilibria in which each bank offers several contracts. 
1.3.e. Interpretation and comments on equilibria 
(a) A given market can either have a pure pooling rationing equilibrium or a 
partially separating rationing equilibrium, but not both. This follows from the 
fact that the pooling equilibrium with rationing requires v{G} < vJ{F}, the 
partially separating equilibrium requires that v { G } > vJ { F }. 
(b) Note that this analysis differs from the earlier Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson 
analyses in several fundamental ways. First, we have both adverse selection 
(sorting) and moral hazard (incentive) problems. Second, because of the 
incentive effects of contracts, there may exist pooling equilibria (even at interior 
points in the contract space). Third, in the R-S-W analyses, equilibrium is fully 
revealing, and there is no rationing. Here, in both the pure pooling and in the 
partially separating equilibria, we do not obtain full revelation, while we do 
obtain rationing. This is in spite of the fact that we have enriched the 'strategy' 
space to allow simultaneous use of both interest rates and collateral 
requirements, and to allow banks to offer several contracts. 
1.4. Some extensions 
1.4.a. Differing sets offeasible techniques 
Allowing the set of feasible techniques to differ across borrowers, makes our 
results easier to obtain. This can be seen by observing that the conditions for 
a pure pooling equilibrium with rationing are certainly more readily satisfied 
if the set of techniques available to the poor borrowers stochastically dominates 
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the techniques available to rich borrowers. In that case, a lender would be less 
likely to increase collateral as a means of eliminating rationing. 
1.4.b. Continuum of projects 
Allowing each type of borrower to choose from a continuum of projects, 
rather than just two projects requires a slight change of notation, but otherwise 
does not substantially affect our results. In the case of a pure pooling equilibrium, 
we define r* [z, C] as the interest rate at which the bank's expected return per 
dollar loaned is maximized when it requires Cp of collateral on loans to a 
proportion z of poor borrowers. If the return on contract (r*, Cp) exceeds the 
maximum return on a loan to a rich borrower, and there is an excess demand 
for credit when contract {r*, Cp} is offered, then there is a pure pooling 
equilibrium with all banks offering contract {r*, Cp}. Similar arguments can 
be made for extending our construction of partially separating contracts and 
completely separating contracts with rationing to the case where a continuum 
of techniques is available to borrowers. 
1.4.c. Many types of borrowers 
Our model, in which each type of borrower has a different endowment of 
collateralizable wealth, may also be directly extended to the case of many types 
of borrowers. The analyses of pure pooling and the separating equilibria with 
rationing follow directly from our analysis with two types. In the pure pooling 
equilibrium all borrowers again choose contract {F}. 
In the case of a partial pooling equilibrium, we begin with the wealthiest 
types, and assume that in equilibrium, among the contracts which are feasible 
for the richer borrowers, they prefer the higher collateral contracts. The contract 
{ G1 } that maximizes the return for loans to the wealthiest borrowers determines 
the return v(G1) for all other loans. The proportion of the wealthiest borrowers 
that get loans at contract { G1 } is just sufficient to ensure that the bank's 
maximum expected return on loans at a contract requiring collateral equal to 
the collateralizable wealth of the next wealthiest borrowers is equal to v(G1). 
Denoting that contract by { G2 }, the proportion of applicants getting loans at 
contract { G2 } is such that the maximum return from loans at a contract requiring 
collateral equal to the collateralizable wealth of the third wealthiest borrowers 
is also equal to v{G1,}. This process continues through all types. It is easy to 
specify supply curves for loanable funds and return functions for different types 
of borrowers that will generate rationing of each type of borrower. 
1.4.d. Additional instruments 
Collateral is just one of the instruments by which banks attempt to select 
among applicants and to provide incentives for borrowers to undertake safer 
projects. Other instruments face similar problems in combining conflicting 
incentive/selection effects, or in any case, are sufficiently ineffective as to leave 
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a residual incentive/selection problem of the kind with which we have been 
concerned here. 
2. Macro-economic implications 
In this section, we explore the macro-economic implications of credit 
rationing. We address three issues: (a) the consequences of a shift in returns to 
different projects, such as might occur over the business cycle (Section 2.1); 
(b) the consequences of a shift in the supply of funds (Section 2.2); and (c) the 
implications of credit rationing for monetary policy (Section 2.3). Macro- 
economic analyses that make use of the concept of the 'representative' firm and 
the representative consumer cannot adequately address macroeconomic 
problems that arise from imperfect information (where heterogeneity is central). 
The models we present are intended to be the simplest ones within such problems 
can be addressed. 
2.1. Analyses of cyclical variability in interest rates: Effects of changes in 
productivity 
Traditionally, theoretical analyses of cyclical variations in a market consist 
(in large part) of determining the equilibriating responses in prices (interest 
rates, wages) and quantities to particular disturbances to demand and supply 
in various markets. Our theory implies that changes in (real) interest rates 
charged investors cannot be inferred from an analysis simply of changes in 
demand and supply for funds. This ambiguity holds even if credit is not being 
rationed. 
Our analysis identifies as critical determinants of the real interest rate charged 
borrowers the probabilities of success of risky and safe projects. Both 
probabilities are likely to change over the cycle (as reflected, for instance, in 
the marked cyclicity of bankruptcy rates). What turns out to be crucial are the 
relative changes. Our model is consistent with a wide variety of patterns of 
cyclical movements in interest rates charged, interest rates received, and in the 
degree of rationing. It is consistent, in particular, with real interest rates charged 
borrowers rising in recessions while that paid depositors falls. To see this, 
however, we first need to study the consequences of proportionate changes in 
success probabilities. 
In the preceding section, we showed that equilibria could take on several 
different forms. Because banks do offer a variety of loan contracts with different 
collateral requirements, we believe that the partial separating/pooling 
equilibrium provides the best description of the market. We showed that in 
such an equilibrium there can be (but, not necessarily is) credit rationing at 
every contract (loan type).33 The analysis of that case is, however, far more 
" There can also be partial separating/pooling equilibria without rationing. Many of the 
comparative statics propositions we are about to derive hold in either regime. We focus on the 
rationing regime partially because of its (relative) analytical simplicity. 
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tedious than that for pooling equilibria. Accordingly, we present the results for 
pooling rationing equilibria, and simply summarize the results (presented in 
Appendix A) for the partial separating/pooling equilibria. 
2.1.a. Balanced changes in success probabilities 
Assume that the probability of success of both the safe and the risky techniques 
of production are changed in the same proportion. For simplicity, we write 
pS* = flpSI pr* = fppr, / > 0. 
/1 varies procyclically, e.g. / > 1 in a boom < 1 in a recession. Then, rewriting 
equation (3), describing the switch line, 
[U(Yr) - U(yo)]pr* = [U(Ys)) - U(yo)]ps* (8) 
we immediately see that the switch line is unaffected. It thus follows that if there 
is a pooling equilibrium with rationing, the rate of interest and the collateral 
requirement will remain unchanged. But since the expected return to the bank 
(and hence the interest paid to borrowers) is equal to 
i -v=- P(1 + r) + (1- P)CP 
(where 3 = zps + (1 - z)pr, the mean probability of success), i is increased by 
an increase in /1. Given L' (i) > 0 the supply of funds is increased. Hence if the 
demand for funds is unchanged, the incidence of credit rationing is reduced as 
the economy goes into a boom. Of course, in practice, over the business cycle, 
the demand for loans is likely to vary markedly as well, and whether in practice 
the extent of rationing increases or decreases in booms depends on the relative 
movements of the demand for funds and the supply. Either is, on a priori grounds, 
possible. 
2.1.b. Unbalanced changes in success probabilities 
Assume now, however, that as the economy goes into a recession, risky 
projects have a disproportionate increase in their probability of failure, and in 
a boom, they have a disproportionate increase in their probability of success. 
We write 
pS* = ,fps, pr* = fpr. 
We adopt the convention that / > 1 in a boom, /1 < 1 in a recession, and 
0 d In 3 
d In /1 
that is, the probability of success of a safe project falls in a recession (but less 
than that of a risky project) and increases in a boom (but again, less than that 
of a risky project). 
An increase in 3 shifts the switch line. The equation for the switch line can 
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now be written 
[U(Y1) - U(yo)]pr = [U(Y,) - U(Yo)]p (9) 
since by definition of a safe and risky project bpS > pr, this implies that 
dr/dblEUR=EU = Us(yr > U0(ys)ps (10) 
i.e. the switch line shifts up in a recession as the risky project becomes relatively 
less attractive, down in a boom. Thus, in the pooling equilibrium, provided 
risky projects exhibit more cyclical volatility than do safe projects, interest rates 
charged borrowers will move in a counter-cyclical manner. 
Even more surprising is the result that for sufficiently 'unbalanced' changes 
in productivity, the interest rate paid depositors may actuallyfall in a boom. That 
is, recalling our definition of j as the mean probability of success in a pooling 
equilibrium, and evaluating v at the pooling equilibrium at F, 
dv ( alIn Al n 3 dr 
d= p + a fl3bzps\( I + rF<-0Cp) + P < n dif 
dfl Ilnf3Jn# I 
aln(31 
A lnf d ln(1 + rF) 1 zps* 




is the change in the interest rate of contract { F } induced by a change in A, 
(given by (10)). When v decreases and rF decreases, the magnitude 
of credit rationing will increase in a boom.34 
It is thus apparent that our model is consistent with a variety of patterns of 
cyclical movements of the extent of credit rationing and interest rates paid and 
charged. Our model is, in particular, consistent with the fact that interest rates 
are far less volatile than the returns to equity. 
2.2. Changes in the supply offunds 
One of the reasons for our interest in credit rationing is that it raises the 
possibility that the way that the central bank affects the level of economic 
activity is not through changes in the interest rate but through changes in credit 
availability. 
In this section, we trace out the consequences of an outward shift in the 
supply function of resources available to be lent. 
As more resources become available, the number of projects undertaken 
increases, but the average interest rate charged may remain unchanged (in the 
34 We are taking the normal case where the supply of loanable resources is an increasing function 
of the interest rate paid depositors. 
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pooling equilibrium) or may actually increase (in the separating or partially 
separating equilibrium). To see how an increase in the supply of loanable 
resources could increase the average interest rate charged, observe that an 
increase in the number of loans made at contract G increases the return to 
banks from loans at F. Therefore, if returns on the contracts (F) and (G) are 
to remain the same, the number of loans made at (G) must remain unchanged; 
small changes in the availability of credit only affect the quantity of low collateral 
loans. But the interest rate charged on the low collateral loans must exceed 
that on the high collateral loans, and hence an increase in the supply of loanable 
resources must cause the average interest rate charged to increase. A fuller 
analysis of the effects of a change in the supply of loanable resources is contained 
in Appendix B. There we note too that as the supply curve for funds shifts the 
nature of the equilibrium (rationing at two contracts, rationing at one contract, 
no rationing, etc.) may change. 
We should emphasize that while a reduction in the available resources reduces 
investments, the projects which are eliminated are not necessarily those with 
the lowest expected gross returns, ie, those for which, in our model, pR is lowest. 
2.3. Monetary policy, macroeconomic equilibrium, and credit rationing 
There is a sense in which our model conforms closely to traditional views, 
and a sense in which it differs markedly. 
In traditional Keynesian analyses, an increase in 'M' (money supply) leads 
to a reduction in interest rates; the reduction in interest rates leads to an increase 
in investment; and the increase in investment leads to a higher level of income.35 
The traditional analysis was based on a stable relationship between money, 
income and interest rates, and is usually motivated by some transactions story 
(ignoring, of course, the fact that most transactions, in dollar terms, are trades 
in assets, and there is no a priori reason for a stable relationship between asset 
transfers and income flows-on the contrary, there are strong a priori reasons 
that over the business cycle this relationship might change). The traditional 
analysis also obfuscated which interest rate was relevant, and ignored the fact 
that, except in certain isolated periods (1930-5,. 1980-8) real interest 
rates-which modern economists would argue are the relevant ones-have 
varied relatively little (Jaffee and Stiglitz (1989)) and have been negligible relative 
to the expected returns demanded by firms on their investments. 
In our analysis, there are two critical links, one between the money supply, 
'M', and credit availability, A, and another between credit availability and 
investment. Of course, if, as in simpler versions of our model, 
A = aM, 
the available credit (A) is proportional to the money supply, and 
I = Ab, 
35 This 'dynamic' interpretation ignores the fact that the interest rate and income are determined 
simultaneously in the standard model. 
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investment I is proportional to the supply of available credit, then, if 
Y = Consumption + Investment + Government expenditure (G), and 
C = mY 
then 
Y abM + G 
1-rm 
national income increases with money supply, as in conventional monetary 
models. This is the sense in which our model is similar to standard models. 
But it is equally important to note the differences. First, we would argue that 
the link between 'M' and 'A' is likely to change over the business cycle, with 
an increase in money supply having a relatively weak effect on credit availability 
in recessionary periods. (For a more extended discussion of the link between 
M and A, see Blinder and Stiglitz (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990, 1992b).) 
Second, we note that monetary policy can be contractionary (expansionary) 
even though the average real interest charged borrowers changes little, or indeed 
decreases (increases). More generally, our model suggests that neither of the 
intermediate targets often proposed for monetary policy-interest rates or money 
supply-may be closely related to what the government is ultimately interested 
in, and accordingly these intermediate targets should only be used with caution. 
Third, our model explains why monetary policy seems to have such different 
effects in different sectors of the economy,36 and why the interest rate charged 
borrowers in different sectors may change at different rates, or even in different 
directions. Our theory predicts that credit rationing may be more important in 
certain sectors than in others, and indeed a decrease in the availability of credit 
could be largely felt in a few sectors-those like home construction (i) which 
are higher leveraged, and (ii) which face (because of information asymmetries) 
equity and credit rationing.37 Whether one wishes, as a matter of policy, to 
make those sectors bear the brunt of the required macroeconomic adjustments 
should be a subject for debate. 
36 Though in principle, the interest elasticity of different sectors may well differ, so that a given 
change in the interest rate would have a different impact on different sectors, interest elasticity itself 
should be derived from the demand elasticities and production functions of the different sectors. 
We doubt that there exist reasonable demand elasticities and production functions that would 
enable the observed patterns of responses can be accounted for within the traditional models. The 
empirical question is, do we believe, for instance, that the sensitivity of home construction to real 
interest rates is due to characteristics of the production function or to characteristics of the industry's 
financial structure, itself related to a variety of organizational factors. See Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1988b). 
3 Even if credit rationing is prevalent in some industries because of information asymmetries, 
we have to argue that there are not good substitutes for credit, that is, firms cannot resort to the 
equity markets for raising needed capital. Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf [1984], among others, provide explanations for 'equity rationing'. Their analyses also 
provides insights into what kinds of firms will most likely face equity rationing constraints. 
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Fourth, our model suggests that monetary policy may have a much larger 
effect on investment if the economy is in a boom with credit rationing regime 
than if it is not.38 
Fifth, one of the reasons that monetary policy has effects when it does is that 
other forms of credit are, for many borrowers, imperfect substitutes for bank 
borrowing (because of the differential information of the bank, and the problems 
associated with transferring information). 
Concluding remarks 
This paper has, we hope, made a contribution both to the microeconomic 
theory of market equilibrium with asymmetric information and to macro- 
economic theory and policy. In most markets, asymmetric information-of 
both the moral hazard and adverse selection variety-is present and pervasive. 
We have shown that combining adverse selection and moral hazard 
considerations in the same model can lead to patterns of equilibria which differ 
from those which arise when either is present in isolation. Equilibrium may be 
characterized by complete or partial pooling; there may be (some) self-selection 
and rationing; and there may be rationing at all contracts.39 
Indeed, we have show that there may be credit rationing at all contracts 
offered, even when collateral can, and is, used optimally (in conjunction with 
the other provisions of the loan contract, in particular, the interest rate charged) 
to differentiate among borrowers with differing probabilities of default. Credit 
rationing can occur if three conditions are satisfied: 
1. There must be some residual uncertainty (information imperfection), after 
lenders employ whatever means they have at their disposal to differentiate 
among applicants and to control their behavior.40 
2. The adverse selection/adverse incentive effects of changing interest rates 
or the non-price terms of the contract (collateral, equity, etc.) must be 
sufficiently strong (at some values of the relevant variables) that it is not 
optimal for the lender to use these instruments fully to allocate credit. 
3. The supply of funds must be such that at the Walrasian equilibrium (where 
demand equals supply, taking into account the use of non-price 
instruments), the expected returns to the lender are lower than for some 
other contract, at which there exists credit rationing. 
38 Our model is thus consistent with the observation that in recessionary periods, monetary 
policy often seems to have little effect (because of the excess liquidity in the banking system at the 
time, monetary policy has little effect on the availability of credit; and since credit is not 
constrained-borrowing is limited by firms' aversion to assuming additional risks-monetary 
policy can only attain its effects through the interest rate mechanism) while in other times, the 
imposition of a tight monetary policy seems to have large effects. 
3 This is in contrast with the simple models with only adverse selection or only moral hazard, 
where rationing occurred at most at one contract. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the comment by 
Riley (1986) and our reply (1986). 
40 This includes not only the self-selecting mechanisms which have been the focus of this paper, 
but also auditing (direct examination). 
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The first condition, we would contend, is virtually always satisfied, but the 
second and third conditions may or may not be: we believe that credit markets 
are sometimes, but not always, characterized by credit rationing.4' When credit 
rationing is observed, it may be caused by other factors (such as legal restraints 
on the level of interest rates charged). But there are circumstances in which 
credit rationing occurs at interest rates below legally imposed ceilings. 
Further, the comparative statics of these markets (with adverse selection and 
moral hazard, with or without credit rationing) look markedly different from 
those associated with standard markets, and it is these comparative static 
propositions which provide the bridge between the macroeconomic and 
macroeconomic analyses. 
It should be stressed that the major differences between the comparative 
static properties of our model and other macroeconomic models continue to 
hold even if the economy is not in a rationing regime. These differences and 
the different effects of monetary policy in our model arise from the sorting and 
incentive effects of contracts, not from credit being rationed. 
Standard representative agent models find it difficult to explain in a consistent 
manner the patterns of movements in productivity, real interest rates paid 
depositors and charged borrowers. The analysis here, as in much of other recent 
work on capital market imperfections, is predicated on the proposition that 
asymmetric information is particularly important in capital markets, that debt 
and equity contracts are different, and that understanding these differences is 
critical to understanding cyclical variability. Here, we have stressed the fact that 
interest rates charged need not, and will not in general, move in a way closely 
linked to movements in productivity. To put it somewhat loosely, the fraction 
of the total returns to an investment project which can be captured by lenders 
can vary over the business cycle, and indeed can vary depending on the source 
of the original shock to the economy. 
The discrepancy between the return to the bank and total returns to 
investment projects has important welfare implications: it means not only that 
banks, in the process of sorting among potential borrowers, do not necessarily 
choose those loans with the highest total returns, but it also means that when 
credit is restricted, as through monetary policy, it is not necessarily the projects 
with the lowest return which are terminated.42 
* Stanford University 
** Boston University 
APPENDIX A 
Effects of cyclical changes in productivity on interest rates charged: partially separating equilibrium 
1. Balanced producticity changes 
In the case of balanced productivity changes (described in Section 2.1 .a), the contracts offered ({ F } 
41 We can show that if the first two conditions are satisfied, then there always exists some credit 
supply functions for which credit rationing will occur. 
42 More generally, it can be shown that market equilibrium is not even constrained Pareto optimal. 
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and { G }) will remain unchanged. Since the return of G has increased, the return at (F } must have 
increased. To see what happens to the fraction IF } who are poor, we observe that for v IF 
to equal v{G} 
[Ipsx + (1 - x)Ip'](l + rF) + ( - (psx + (1 - x)fp'))C, = fp'(l + rG) + (1 - _pr)Cr 
(where rF and rG are the rates of interest in contracts (F} and {G} respectively), from which it 
follows that 
f dx/df = - [Cr - C,]/(ps* - p'*)(l + rF - Cp) <0, 
ie, when f3 increases a smaller fraction of the rich get loans at contract { G } so that a larger fraction 
accept contract (F }. The intuition is as follows: An equi-proportionate increase in success 
probabilities decreases the value of collateral to the lender. Because G loans demand more collateral 
than F loans, an increase in ft has a smaller effect on the profitability of {G} loans that of {F} 
loans. If both F and G loans are to continue to be made, the increased profitability of F loans 
must be offset by an increase in the proportion of rich borrowers choosing F loans, ie, x must 
decrease. 
Since v{G} is increased, the interest rate paid depositors is increased, and so is the aggregate 
quantity of loans. If this effect is not sufficient to eliminate rationing at contract G, both the 
proportion and absolute number of G loans would fall as banks making F loans are able to compete 
more aggressively for borrowers. Hence the average interest rate charged and average interest rate 
paid both increase with f. (move procyclically). 
2. Unbalanced changes in success probabilities. 
Under the assumptions given in Section 1.3.c, for a partially separating rationing equilibrium, 
the interest rates on both contracts (F} and (G} decrease when the success probabilities of risky 
projects have a greater percentage increase than the success probabilities of safe projects. We argued 
that these disproportionate changes are characteristic of booms. But the decrease in the interest 
rate at (G} may either exceed or be less than at (F}. 
As we see from (10), depending on differences in non-collateralizable wealth between the rich 
and poor relative to their differences in collateralizable wealth and differences in their risk aversion, 
interest rates at the high collateral contract could fluctuate more or less over the business cycle 
than interest rates at the low collateral contract. 
As before, the returns at (F } and (G} are altered, but by differing amounts. Hence, for the return 
at (F} to equal the return on (G}, the fraction of loans made at {G} will have to adjust, but it 
ambiguous whether it will increase or decrease. Accordingly, although there may be some 
presumption that the average rate of interest charged will decrease in a boom, it is possible that 
if the proportion of the rich getting loans is decreased enough, then the average rate of interest 
charged borrowers will actually increase.43 
For sufficiently 'unbalanced' changes in productivity, interest rates paid depositors may fall, i.e. 
dv ral n 6 drG I-= p 1 + rG-C + < 0 
if 
a lnc 1 
alnfI d ln(1 + rG) 1 
d In 6 I 1-(CPI(l + rG)) 
Our discussion in this section has been predicated on the changes in productivity being sufficiently 
small that there is no change in regime. Of course, with large productivity shocks, the economy 
may go from a situation where there is credit rationing, to one where there is not, or conversely. 
43 It is possible that, as the economy enters a recession, the proportion of loans made at contract 
(F} increases. This is particularly striking, given that in slumps the (social) productivity of the 
risky technique is particularly low relative to that of safe techniques, and only loans at contract 
{F} are financing the risky technique. 
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APPENDIX B 
Comparative statics analysis of effects of changes in supply of loanable funds 
Case I 
Rich borrowers prefer contract {F} to {G}, and v(G) > v.(F). (i) Let us suppose that initially 
there is an excess demand for credit (by rich borrowers) at contract G: L(v(G)) < Nr. The equilibrium 
is then characterized by only contract G being offered. (ii) Now let us consider an outward shift 
in the supply of loanable funds function so that L(v(G)) > N. Banks will then compete for rich 
borrowers by moving the contract they offer rich borrowers southwest along the switch line of the 
rich borrowers. (For expositional simplicity, we restrict our analysis throughout this Appendix to 
cases in which the high collateral contract requires more than CP of collateral.) This movement 
continues until a contract is reached such that v(H) = v.(F). (iii) Suppose rich borrowers prefer 
contract { F } to { H}. Then further outward movements in the supply of loanable funds function 
will cause contract F to be offered; the number of contract F loans offered will be such that when 
all rejected rich borrowers get credit at contract H, the quantity of loans made is equal to L(v(H)). 
(iv) Further outward shifts in the loanable funds function will first eliminate rationing at 
contract F. There will then be a complete pooling equilibrium. Still further increases in supply will 
result in a southwest movement along the switch line of the poor borrowers. We denote this contract 
by F." (v) If the utility function of borrowers is characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
the indifference curves of the rich borrowers become flatter as they become better off. Consequently, 
there may be a supply function of funds for which there exists a contract ?1 along the rich individual's 
switch line such that 
v(t) = v(fW) 
and 
EUr(F) = EUr(f1), 
and 
L(v(fI)) = N 
the rich borrowers are indifferent between the high and low collateral contracts, both of which 
yield the same return to the bank. 
At that point further outward movements in the supply of loanable funds function would be 
accompanied by some rich borrowers choosing high collateral contracts in preference to low 
collateral contracts. The greater is the proportion of rich borrowers choosing the high collateral 
contract, the greater is the proportion of poor borrowers among those choosing the low 
collateral contract, and consequently the higher is the return on that contract. The contract pairs, 
and choices of rich borrowers would then be such that rich borrowers are indifferent between the 
contract being chosen, and banks make the same return on the two contracts, ie, the contract pairs 
will lie on the indifference curve of rich borrowers through the high collateral contract, and the 
ratio of rich borrowers choosing the high collateral contract in preference to the low collateral one 
will be such as to equate the return to a bank from the two contracts.45 
Case 2 
Rich borrowers prefer contract {G} to contract {F}, v(G) > v1(F) and L(v(G)) < N. Initially, 
only G is offered. As the supply of funds function shifts outward, eliminating rationing, the contract 
being offered moves along the switch line of the rich borrowers until some contract H is offered 
such that v(H) = v1(F). 
Since the rich prefer { H } to { G } to { F }, they prefer { H } to { F }; if contract { F } is offered as 
well as contract {H}, contract {F} is only chosen by the poor borrowers. Further outward 
movements of the loan supply function would first cause an increase in the number of loans made 
at contract F, and then southwest movements of both the low and high collateral contracts along 
the switch lines of the poor and rich borrowers. 
44 We note the possibility that the indifference curve through F for the poor individuals may be 
flatter than that of the rich (at higher levels of collateral). 
45 That is v,(F) = v(H) for some x > z and EUr(P) = EUr(f). 
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Case 3 
Finally, let us consider the case where rich borrowers prefer contract G to F but v,(F) > v(G), 
and L(v.(F)) < N. Then the equilibrium is characterized by only contract F being offered. Starting 
at this equilibrium, outward shifts in the supply of loanable funds function first reduce and then 
eliminate rationing at F. Further outward shifts cause banks to move the contract they offer 
southwest along the switch line of the poor borrowers until contract F' satisfying v.(F') = v(G) is 
reached. At that point, if the rich borrowers prefer F' to G, a single contract continues to be offered 
and outward shifts to the loan supply function continue to cause southwest movements of the 
contract along the switch line of the poor borrowers. 
On the other hand, suppose the rich borrowers prefer G to F'. Consider a contract F" along the 
poor's switch line, such that v,(F") = v(G). If rich borrowers prefer G to F", then both contracts 
would be offered in equilibrium. All the rich borrowers choose G and all the poor borrowers choose 
F". Further outward shifts in the loan supply function cause southwest movements of the two 
contracts along the switch lines of the poor and rich. At all points, the contracts generate the same 
return. Only poor borrowers choose the low collateral contract. Rich borrowers choose the high 
collateral contract. 
If the rich borrowers prefer F" to G then some contract F * lying on the switch line of poor 
borrowers between F' and F" is offered such that the rich borrowers are indifferent between this 
intermediate contract and contract G. In equilibrium, the proportion of rich borrowers choosing 
G when offered F * is such that the two contracts generate the same returns to banks. Further 
outward shifts in the supply of funds function would then cause southwest movements along the 
two switch lines. The contract pairs lie on the same indifference curve of the rich borrowers. The 
proportion of rich borrowers choosing the low collateral contract is such that the two contracts 
generate the same expected return to a bank. 
APPENDIX C 
Multiple contract equilibria 
In the text, we restricted the analysis to the case where each bank offers a single contract. In 
this appendix, we extend the analysis to the case where each bank can offer multiple contracts. We 
show that the equilibria we derived in the text remain equilibria under this expansion of the 
admissible strategies. This change in the admissible strategies may result in their being additional 
equilibria. We do not pursue that possibility here. 
In the case where banks can offer more than one contract, borrowers face a more difficult 
problem: assuming that the bank knows all the contracts for which a borrower has applied, the 
bank may make inferences based on those applications. The borrower then has to make an inference 
about what the bank will do if he applies for, say, two loans; this will, presumably, depend on 
what inferences the bank makes about the type of individual that applies for two loans. Since what 
will be critical in determining the nature of the equilibrium is beliefs about out of equilibrium 
moves, it is in this case that the variety of refinements of Nash equilibrium become important. 
To see that the pooling equilibrium of Section 1.3a, with each bank offering a single contract, 
can easily be supported as a Nash equilibrium, consider a bank deviating from this equilibrium 
by offering several contracts. 
Clearly in this case there are beliefs that would deter a bank from making that deviation. For 
instance, suppose all potential borrowers thought that the bank believed that borrowers that apply 
for any contract other than the lowest collateral one are rich. Because in the pooling equilibrium 
with rationing the return paid depositors is 1 + i = v.(F) > v(G), loans to rich borrowers generate 
losses; therefore, the belief that only rich borrowers apply for the higher collateral loans would 
lead borrowers to the further belief that if they applied for one of the high collateral contracts, the 
bank would not lend to them at any contract. Consequently, no borrowers would apply for the 
higher collateral contract, and offering more than one contract would be equivalent to offering 
only the lowest collateral contract. (Note that if a bank could commit itself to financing a fixed 
percentage of the applications for high-collateral-low-interest-rate loans, then the pooling 
equilibrium with rationing could always be broken. We do not consider it realistic to expect 
commitments of that sort to be enforceable.) 
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